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INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER IN KENTUCKY-PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE
One of the most complex and demanding social problems which
confronts the public today involves the proper approach to be taken
in the field of criminal legislation. The opinions in this area are as
varied as the types of crimes with new theories being constantly
advocated in an effort to reach the proper method of handling the
problem.
Out of the range of proposals which extends from extreme leniency
to extreme severity, lawmakers are faced with extracting a solution
which will serve to strike an equitable balance between all the
pertinent factors. There must be provisions for protecting the public
from criminals, and yet leave room for the rehabilatation of those
who can later be returned safely to society. There must also be
wisdom in the act so that it will be sufficient to deter the criminal and
yet not be so harsh that it is unjust.
After the legislature expresses their intent and desire in the form
of a statute, they generally leave the task of enforcement and adminis-
tration of the criminal law to the courts and the bar. Therefore, in
order that the courts and bar adequately carry out the task which is
incumbent on them, it is mandatory that judges and prosecutors under-
stand the legislative intent of the statute.
The crimes which are classified under the general category of
homicide have been given considerable attention in recent years, and
this trend is evident today in Kentucky where a controversy is currently
raging over abolishing the death penalty. Reforms in criminal law
are constantly before a legislature, and due to the public reaction in
this area of homicide, legislatures must be diligent in enacting only
those measures which are truly reforms.
Negligent homicide has recently been the object of legislation in
Kentucky with the passage, in 1962, of a new involuntary man-
slaughter statute.1 Negligent homicide seems to pose a real problem
IKy. Rev. Stat. 435.022 [hereinafter cited as KRS]-Involuntary Man-slaughter:(1) Any person who causes the death of a human being by an act
creating such extreme risk of death or great bodily injury as to
manifest a wanton indifference to the value of human life according
to the standard of conduct of a reasonable man under the circum-
(Continued on next page)
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for lawmakers when they attempt to enact adequate legislation on the
subject since the term "negligence" eludes simple definition. The
difficulty of finding a simple, precise definition for negligence also
brings up the problem of enacting a statute which is specific enough
to allow for the prosecution of those who are, in fact, criminally
negligent, and yet, not be such as to subject to criminal prosecution
those who should only be civilly liable.
The statute passed by the Kentucky Legislature in 1962 appears
to be an adequate measure, provided the courts and bar conform to
the intent and purpose of the statute. In order that the intent and
purpose can be determined, an attempt will be made to point out
the status of involuntary manslaughter before 1962, then the change
which resulted with passage of the new law, and finally a summary in
respect to what the statute accomplishes and what improvements need
to be made.
I. Tim PAST
In order to properly understand the impact of the new statute, a
discussion of the background of homicide in Kentucky is essential. A
factual and historical foundation will first be established on which to
base the remainder of the propositions that are set out herein.
2
Prior to passage of KRS 485.022, Kentucky did not have a statute
dealing specifically with involuntary manslaughter, and anyone con-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
stances shall be guilty of manslaughter in the first degree and shall
be confined in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than
fifteen years.
(2) Any person who causes the death of a human being by reckless
conduct according to the standard of conduct of a reasonably [sic]
man under the circumstances shall be guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter in the second degree and shall be imprisoned in the countyjail for a term not exceeding twelve months or fined a sum not
exceeding $5,000 or both. (1962, c. 90, §§ 1, 2)
2 For obvious reasons, the discussion here cannot be as complete and com-
prehensive on history and background as would be desired. But in order for one
to be able to fully appreciate the importance and effect of the new statute, a
portion must be devoted to this area. Unless one has some basic understanding
in this field, it is very possible that what follows may appear to be meaningless.
Therefore, it is highly recommended that the reader refer to an article by
Professor Roy Moreland, Kentucky Homicide Law with Recommendations, 51 Ky.
LJ. 59 (1962), in which he discusses, in more detail, the background and transi-
tion of Kentucky homicide law and the cases bearing on it. Professor Moreland,
whom the court refers to in the first case interpreting KRS 485.022, Lambert v.
Commonwealth, 877 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1964), was a member of the study
committee which formulated the revision of Kentucky homicide laws and presented
the new statute to the Legislative Research Commission [hereinafter cited as LRC].
He relates the ideas and purposes, as well as the intent, which the committee had
in proposing the revision. The applicable portions of the information set out in
Professor Moreland's article are used to reinforce the contentions as to the intent
and purposes of the new statute, and to furnish a basic outline for the brief dis-
cussion on homicide history in this jurisdiction.
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victed of this common-law crime had his punishment set by KRS
431.075.3 As a result of the lack of a specific statute embracing
involuntary manslaughter and the leniency of the punishment under
KRS 431.075, various problems arose, particularly concerning the
elements involved in constituting and distinguishing the offense.
Kentucky has long had statutes which cover the offenses of willful
murder4 and voluntary manslaughter, 5 and in a substantial percentage
of the cases involving a homicide, before 1962, the offense was
prosecuted under one of these statutes even where the death occurred
as a result of negligence.6 This procedure led to many legal and
logical inaccuracies since a defendant could be convicted of a crime
when his act lacked one of the elements necessary to constitute the
offense, e.g., specific intent in a negligent death prosecuted as volun-
tary manslaughter or willful murder. To get around this missing
element, the courts made use of the old common-law concept of
"implied intent" with the result that a defendant was convicted of an
intentional crime when there was, in fact, no actual intent to cause
death.7
The Kentucky Legislature, recognizing the need for a change in
the area of homicide law, passed a resolution in 1960 referring the
3 KRS 431.075-Common-law Offenses, Penalties for:
Any person convicted of a common-law offense the penalty for which
is not otherwise provided by statute shall be imprisoned in the county
jail for a term not exceeding twelve months or fined a sum not exceeding
$5,000 or both. (1950, c. 169)
See Eads v. Commonwealth, 296 S.W.2d 449 (Ky. 1956); Marye v .Common-
wealth, 240 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1951).4 KRS 435.010-Murder: "Any person who commits willful murder shall be
punished by confinement in the penitentiary for life, or by death."
5 KRS 435.020-Voluntary Manslaughter: "Any person who commits volun-
tary manslaughter shall be confined in the penitentiary for not less than two nor
more than twenty-one years.
6 See Pelfrey v. Commonwealth, 247 Ky. 484, 57 S.W.2d 474 (1933); Davis
v. Commonwealth, 193 Ky. 597, 237 S.W. 24 (1922), 23 A.L.R. 1557. See
generally Moreland, supra note 2, 71-83, 97-100, 114-17.
7See Davidson v. Commonwealth, 340 S.W.2d 243 (Ky. 1960); Ewing v.
Commonwealth, 129 Ky. 237, 111 S.W. 352 (1908); Montgomery v. Common-
wealth, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 356, 81 S.W. 264 (1904); York v. Commonwealth, 82
Ky. 360 (1884); Sparks v. Commonwealth, 66 Ky. L. Rep. (3 Bush) 111 (1867),
96 Am. Dec. 196. One concept to be kept in mind is whether it is correct to say
that death is the natural and probable consequence of a felony where the death
is a pure accident. The idea underlies some of the theories which have been
pursued, and this writer contends that to advocate such is a fallacy. A defendant
is punished, under this concept, because of his intent to perpetrate a felony and
not because of his intent, or absence of it, to cause a death. If it is apparent that
such is the natural and probable consequence of any felony, then there would he
no need for the elaborate discussions on "implied intent." Can one logically, and
reasonably, say that where the defendant was committing burglary and, in the
course of so doing, left a cigarette behind which started a fire that burned the
house down, killing the occupant, he intended this death as the natural and
probable consequence of an act of burglary? By use of the concept of "implied
intent," it would appear that such a result would be possible.
[Vol. 58,
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matter for study to the Legislative Research Commission. This Com-
mission was given the task of reviewing and evaluating the existing
homicide laws and making recommendations to the legislature. The
members of the Commission's study committee were well aware of
the existing situation and recommended reforms which would attempt
to eliminate, or greatly reduce, as many of the problems as could be
reached. Both the willful murder and voluntary manslaughter statutes
were revised, and statutory embodiment was given by the study
committee to the common-law crime of involuntary manslaughter.
By so doing, involuntary manslaughter was removed from under KRS
431.075. Furthermore, the proposed revision of the voluntary man-
slaughter statute attempted to define this offense more precisely with
the intention that this would also aid in removing prosecutions for
unintentional homicides from under KRS 435.020.s
Under KRS 431.075, involuntary manslaughter was a misdemeanor,
and even the maximum penalty, twelve months imprisonment and a
5,000 dollar fine, was comparatively lenient in cases where the offense
was of a serious nature, e.g., felony murder. But by all rights, such a
crime should have been punished under KRS 431.075 since punish-
ment was not otherwise provided by statute. Due partly to the
leniency in punishment, prosecutors were prone to try negligent
homicide cases which involved a degree of negligence higher than
that required for civil liability under the willful murder or voluntary
manslaughter statute, depending primarily on how the crime was
committed. The Kentucky Court of Appeals approved the majority
of such convictions under the old, fallacious concept of "implied
intent."
As a consequence of this practice, there was created what has
been termed "hybrid offenses" or "impossible crimes":0 "felony willful
decision-made offenses concerned acts which lacked the specific intent
that should be present to warrant a conviction under either the willful
murder or voluntary manslaughter statute. The court of appeals was,
S The reader may find it helpful to look at the entire proposed act which is
contained in Moreland, supra note 2, 127-82.9 See Moreland, stupra note 2, 78, 88, 97, 114.
murder"' 0 and "negligent voluntary manslaughter."" Both of these
1
•See Bentley v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 495 (Ky. 1962); Simpson v.
Cornnon-wealth, 298 Ky. 681, 170 S.W.2d 869 (1948); Jackson v. Common-
wealth, 100 Ky. 289, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 795, 88 S.W. 422 (1896); Brown v. Com-
monwealth, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 872, 17 S.W. 220 (1891); Tarrance v. Common-
wealth, 265 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1958) (dictum).
l1See Mullins v. Commonwealth, 269 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. 1954); Hill v.
Commonwealth, 289 Ky. 646, 40 S.W.2d 261 (1981); Jones v. Commonwealth,
200 Ky. 65, 252 S.W. 180 (1928); Davis v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 597, 287
S.W. 24 (1922), 28 A.L.R. 1557.
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therefore, forced to engage in the use of the "implied intent" concept
in order to supply some scintilla of logic in upholding the convictions
of such crimes. It must suffice here to merely point out that both
offenses are contradictions in terms because one cannot be simul-
taneously negligent and intentional (willful; voluntary) while per-
forming the act which resulted in death.12
Therefore, prior to the passage of KRS 485.022, it appears that,
generally, only those homicides where the degree of negligence re-
sulting in death was very slight 8 were punished as involuntary man-
slaughter, with the remainder made to fit under either willful murder
or voluntary manslaughter.
In order to aid in accomplishing the purposes of the LRC's study
committee, the decision was made to propose that the new involuntary
manslaughter statute be divided into two parts: involuntary man-
slaughter, first degree and second degree. Such a division would
result in more definiteness as to what constitutes the offense, and
would provide a clearer distinction between this crime and voluntary
manslaughter. The new statute also would incorporate a standard
which allows the degree of negligence to bear upon the punishment.
II. THE REsEN
The 1962 Kentucky General Assembly, seeing the desirability of
such a revision, enacted the proposed involuntary manslaughter
statute. KRS 485.022 makes involuntary manslaughter punishable
either as a felony or a misdemeanor, depending on whether it is of the
first or second degree, and thereby cures the objectionable leniency
of KRS 431.075.14 The new statute defines the first degree by use of
the words "wanton indifference" and the second degree by the words
12 For a discussion of other common-law crimes which should have been
prosecuted under KRS 431.075, but which were in a state of confusion, and a
more detailed analysis of the logical contradiction involved, see generally More-
land, supra note 2, 70-72, 76-77, 83-99, 113-18.
13 See Marye v. Commonwealth, 240 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1951). The reader is
informed that no discussion of cases which now fall under the provisions of IClS
435.025 will be attempted although some cases of death by negligent operation
of an automobile are cited in this work as reference. These cases, for the most
part, occurred prior to the enactment of the negligent operation statute and since
this offense now has statutory embodiment, it will be eliminated.
14 Study of this statute will reveal that there is no longer a need to use the
voluntary manslaughter statute for adequate punishment because if the de-
fendants act was of sufficient gravity to be wanton, he can get as much as
fifteen years in the penitentiary, a very substantial sentence. And yet, it is possible
for the defendant to get by with only a fine if the jury believes that he was just
reckless in his conduct. This statute gives considerable latitude in fixing a
sentence, and prosecutors need no longer engage in the use of old concepts to
provide an adequate punishment where a deficit once existed.
NOTES
"reckless conduct," both terms used to define various degrees of
negligence, not intentional conduct.
In 1964, the Kentucky Court of Appeals first interpreted the new
statute in the case of Lambert v. Commonwealth, 377 S.W.2d 76 (Ky.
1964). The facts of this case state that the appellant-defendant was
arrested for drunkenness and incarcerated in the city jail at Lexing-
ton, Kentucky. He became involved in a fracas with a fellow prisoner,
the deceased, over cigarettes. During the course of the encounter,
the deceased severely wounded the appellant by cutting him on th
neck with a knife, where appellant became dizzy and bled profusely.
Believing the deceased had apparently done all that he intended,
appellant walked passed him to try and obtain medical aid from the
authorities. Whereupon, the deceased advanced toward appellant
stating that he was "going to finish cutting his head off."15 Appellant
responded to this threat by knocking the deceased to the floor and
then kicked and "stomped" him in such a manner that the injuries
resulted in death.
The appellant was indicted for murder, convicted of voluntary
manslaughter, and given the maximum sentence. The trial court in-
structed on murder, voluntary manslaughter, self-defense and reason-
able doubt as to guilt and as to the degree of the offense.
Lambert appealed on the contention that he was entitled to an
instruction on involuntary manslaughter under KRS 485.022 which
became effective only a few days before the alleged offense occurred.
The court of appeals reversed the conviction and stated that the
appellant was entitled to an instruction on involuntary manslaughter
in view of the facts and the intent of KRS 435.022.16
The court reversed the conviction for voluntary manslaughter in
the Lambert case even though they would have had ample precedent
to sustain it if they had desired to continue the application of pre-
viously used concepts. By so doing, the court added the impetus and
strength of judicial decision to the intent of the legislature which is
concluded to be the same as that of the LRC stated above.
One of the inaccuracies which existed prior to KRS 435.022 and
the Lambert decision was created by the court's joining of the terms
of "reckless and wanton" in reviewing convictions where the death
resulted from defendant's negligence. They used these terms jointly
to describe the negligence which was necessary to sustain convictions,
15 377 S.V.2d 76 at 77.
16 Mr. Gene Lewter assisted the Commonwealth in the preparation of its
brief for this case. He has written a case comment which states the Common-
wealth's theory as presented to the court of appeals. This discussion is contained
in 53 Ky. L.J. 201 (1964).
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under the voluntary manslaughter statute, for crimes which actually
should have been involuntary manslaughter, but which constituted the
"impossible crime" of "negligent voluntary manslaughter."17 The court
makes a distinction, in the Lambert case, between the two terms and
attempts to define each in a new perspective and in accord with their
logical connotation under the new statute. The proposed definitions
are accurate, as far as they go, but it would have been much more
constructive if the court had used this opportunity to make a more
comprehensive definition in order to give courts and prosecutors a
more definite guide in instructing juries and wording indictments.18
A more accurate definition could be obtained for this jurisdiction
by setting out several definitions found in various other decisions,
worded differently, but conveying the same fundamental meaning.
This would enable those parties who must be guided by this opinion
to make a comparison between the old definition used in prior de-
cisions and the one advanced in this decision.'9 After so doing, and
if the court felt it was beneficial, they might then take the most
pertinent and important points from each and combine them into a
single definition of the greatest depth. One should be able to ascertain
from the Lambert case the correct standard to be used in applying
the terms, but it is always helpful to be able to compare ideas on such
points. The suggestion made here would allow for less possible
ambiguity and concerned parties would be afforded an opportunity to
view the definitions in more than just the abstract. Conceding that
perfection is, at best, difficult, and absolutely precise definitions are
virtually impossible among individuals, the use of this method for
defining would bring closer to a common point the practical applica-
tion of the terms.
Nevertheless, the definitions which are given are basically accurate
and do a commendable job in the way of statutory interpretation and
17 See Jones v. Commonwealth, 213 Ky. 356, 281 S.W. 164 (1925).
18 It is absolutely essential that prosecuting attorneys and judges understand
the effects of this decision and read it in the proper perspective. Unless this
occurs, the court is going to be faced with more prosecutions for "impossible
crimes" which is one of the things that the new statute attempts to eliminate.
There is no longer a need for these "hybrids" and every effort should be made,
by those engaged in trials which involve a homicide, to refrain from resorting to
the use of them.19 See Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902, 909
(1944); Davis v. Wyatt, 359 Mo. App. 963, 224 S.W.2d 972, 976-77 (1949);
Huffman v. Gray, 32 Tenn. App. 610, 225 S.W.2d 87, 90 (1949); Moreland,
supra note 2, 118-19 (wanton). See Russell v. Turner, 148 F.2d 562, 566 (8th
Cir. 1945); Phillips v. Briggs, 215 Iowa 461, 245 N.W. 720, 721 (1932); Stout
v. Gallemore, 138 Kan. 885, 26 P.2d 573, 577 (1933); Moreland, supra note 2,
130-31 (reckless conduct). The reader will observe that most of these cases are
civil ones, but they provide very good definitions of the negligent conduct which
is under consideration here,
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clarification, and should eliminate a considerable amount of the need-
less confusion which has been present heretofore.
Another point which can be derived from the Lambert case and
later decisions is that the court intends to eliminate the decision-made
"hybrid offenses" and prosecute an offender under the statute which
logically and accurately applies to his alleged crime.20 This contention
is based on the position taken by the court in two later decisions
involving negligent homicide. One case involved a conviction of
voluntary manslaughter, Hemphill v. Commonwealth, 879 S.W.2d 228
(Ky. 1964),-1 and the other a conviction of murder, Combs v. Com-
monwealth, 878 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1964). In both cases, the court
reaffirmed the Lambert decision and, in the Hemphill case, stated:
It is our view that KRS 435.022 specifically removes from the framework
of voluntary manslaughter those homicides resulting from negligence;
therefore, the new statute makes inapplicable the cases equating negli-
gent homicide with voluntary manslaughter, no matter how gross the
negligence.22
As pointed out by a member of the proposing study committee, the
intention is that the old common-law crimes of felony murder and
negligent murder, and the decision-made offense of "negligent volun-
tary manslaughter," be punished under involuntary manslaughter, first
degree; and the common-law offenses of negligent manslaughter and
misdemeanor manslaughter fall under the second degree.2 This con-
cept would also embody the theory of punishing the offender in
relation to the danger and risk manifested by his act and not by a
rigid standard that imposes a harsh and unjust punishment solely
because the defendant committed a homicide.24
Another point that should be mentioned concerns the court's
definition of the knowledge required by the defendant to warrant a
conviction under KRS 485.022. The court states that "the actor must
2) As stated in note 7 supra, there is a tremendous fallacy involved in the use
of these "impossible crimes,' and even though it may have formerly been an
"evil" born of necessity, there is no longer a need because the new statute
corrccts the deficits which previously existed.
"I The court, in the Hemphill case, sets out the proper form for instructing
the j'ry under KRS 435.022. These instructions also contain the court's definition
for 'wanton indifference" and "reckless conduct" and it is highly recommended
that these be used as guidelines in future cases.
2'2 379 S.V.2d 223 at 226.23 See Moreland, supra note 2, 68, 74-75, 83-85, 113, 117-19, 123-26, 130.
24 See Regina v. Sern6 (1887), 16 Cox, C.C. 31; 3 STEPHENs, HiszoTy oF
THE CLuNAL LAw oF ENGLAND 76 (1883). Under this theory, the offender
is punished for what be actually intended to do, and the punishment can be very
substantial if his act was of a sufficiently dangerous nature. It is believed that
under this theory and KRS 435.022, the punishment will be sufficient to deter
most possible offenders. This concept is another step away from the harsh rule
that prevailed at one time which made any homicide punishable by death,
1965] NOTES
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have conscious knowledge of the probable consequences.... Reckless-
ness involves thoughtlessness while wanton conduct involves actual
knowledge of the probable results... " (Emphasis added. )25
It is submitted that the court of appeals intends objective knowl-
edge as the type required rather than subjective knowledge, but an
inference that the latter standard should apply might be concluded
from a first-blush reading. The proper test of the requisite knowledge
should be that it is based on the standard of a reasonable man acting
under the same circumstances. Therefore, if the jury finds that a
reasonable man should have known that the act which produced
death was dangerous, either wantonly or recklessly so, the defendant
should also have known, and the fact that he did not will not excuse
his conduct.20
As concerns the Lambert case, even with the criticisms, the result
of this decision is correct and basically sound. On retrial, the jury
might reasonably find, under the proper instructions, that the de-
fendant lacked the specific intent which should be proved for
voluntary manslaughter, and that Lambert's act was a wanton or
reckless one. 27 This would also apply to the Hemphill and Combs
decisions.
III. TrB. FuTuRaE
Having taken a look at negligent homicide before 1962, and then
examining the present situation with a view toward ascertaining its
current status, an attempt will now be made to chart a future course
in this area with some recommendations for improvements.
First, it should be made clear that it is the contention of this writer
that Kentucky has made a significant advancement and reform by
25 Lambert v. Commonwealth, 377 S.W.2d 76 at 79.
26A slight qualification on this subject is in order since this writer is not
concluding that the court uses a subjective standard of knowledge in such cases,
particularly in view of the express Iangage concerning the standard in KRS
435.022, supra note 1. It is mentionedmerely to point out that the court's
statement leads to some ambiguity, and it would be helpful to have a better
statement of the court's policy. The court apparently used this statement to try
and convey the idea that the negligence required must be of a higher degree
than that necessary for civil liability, but it could be stated in more precise terms.
27 It is not meant to imply that the appellant might not be found guilty of
voluntary manslaughter on retrial. But, the jury should render its verdict under
the proper instructions, and it can only be proper, in such a case as this, if an
instruction on involuntary manslaughter is included. If, on retrial, the prosecution
can show that the appellant intended to kill, then it would not be involuntary
manslaughter, but if the prosecution is unable to prove intent, then it would be
unjust to punish the appellant for an intentional crime. Even if the prosecution
can only prove negligence, the appellant still faces a maximum penalty of fifteen
years which is only six years short of the sentence he received at the first trial.
If the jury believes that his conduct was only reckless, then it would be unjust to
ut the defendant in confinement for a great length of time. Therefore, it should
be evident that the proper instructions in this type of case prove to be more
equitable to all parties concerned,
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enacting KRS 435.022.28 An examination of the other eighteen states
which have a specific statutory provision embodying involuntary
manslaughter will reveal that, for the most part, they all still use the
"implied intent" concept which was prevalent in Kentucky prior to
1962.29
In the states which have no specific statute embodying the
offense, the approach that is used varies, but for the most part, the
concept of "implied intent" appears to be very much alive. However,
there are indications of a trend away from this idea, even in those
states which have no specific statute, as evidenced by a New York
decision. The New York Court of Appeals has restricted felony
murder by holding that this offense does not embrace any homicide
coincident with a felony, but only those committed in order to bring
about the primary unlawful endeavor. The New York Court went on
to state that the act which results in death must be in furtherance of
the common criminal design, although the homicide itself need not
be such.3 Under this holding, it would seem that the New York Court
requires specific intent before one can be convicted of felony murder;
a requirement which is not necessary in the majority of states.
Kentucky would appear to be leading the way in attempting to
reform homicide on the negligence level by the enactment of a statute
which provides for punishment that is commensurate with the severity
of the offense. KRS 435.022 also cures many of the logical and legal
inaccuracies which once existed and removes some of the harshness
which formally accompanied homicide cases.
Prosecutors should appreciate this new statute since it will provide
them a means for prosecuting criminal negligence cases under a
statute which clearly pertains to such offenses. They will no longer
be forced to engage in fictions in order to obtain a conviction.
2s It is conceded that this new statute is somewhat of an innovation on the
manslaughter level, but it appears to be a very equitable answer to an extremely
vexing problem. Because it is new and not in complete accord with older con-
cepts, it Nill probably be subjected to considerable criticism, but in the final
analysis, it will prove its value and be looked upon as another step in the
modem conception of criminal justice.
29The eighteen states and their involuntary manslaughter statutes are:
Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-456; Arkansas Statutes, 1947, § 41-2209; California
Penal Code Annotated § 192; Colorado Revised Statutes of 1953, § 40-2-7;
Georgia Code Annotated § 26-1009; Idaho Code § 18-4006; Illinois Annotated
Statues, ch. 38, § 9-3; Kansas General Statues, 1949, § 21-414 (also called man-
slaughter, 3d degree); Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, Annotated § 94-2507;
Nevada Revised Statutes § 200.070; New Mexico Statutes of 1953 § 40A-2-3(B);
General Statutes of North Carolina § 14-18; 18 Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated
§ 4703; Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952, § 16-55; Tennessee Code An-
notated § 39-2409; Utah Code Annotated § 76-30-5; Code of Virginia § 18.1-25;
and, West Virginia Code of 1961 § 5920.30 People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 167 N.E.2d 736, 201 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1960).
NoTEs1965]
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Another strong point of the statute which should be favored by
prosecutors is that it will enable a jury which may be in favor of a
conviction, if the sentence would not be too severe, to render such a
verdict. Thus, a defendant will not escape justice because the jury
feels that his act does not deserve the punishment. A jury that is
confronted with the alternatives of either finding a negligent de-
fendant guilty of murder or voluntary manslaughter or setting him
free may be prone to choose the latter course. However, if they also
have the alternative choice of finding the defendant guilty of one of
the degrees of involuntary manslaughter, and setting his penalty at a
period in the county jail, or fining him, or both, they may be more
apt to render a guilty verdict on the basis that the punishment is
more in line with the severity of the crime.
KYRS 435.022 is also a benefit to the courts since it relieves them of
having to instruct under the old concept of "implied intent" which
posed a considerable logical problem. Furthermore, it provides the
courts with a more clear-cut definition of what constitutes involuntary
manslaughter and distinguishes it from those homicides which require
specific intent.
Finally, the new statute serves the needs of both the defendant
and society in a much more equitable way. The defendant is no
longer subjected to harsh and unrealistic prosecutions, and yet, society
is given the protection which it must have by providing for the punish-
ment of those negligent offenders who might, under the old statutes,
be allowed to escape any substantial punishment. After all, the public
has a right to be protected against those members of society who are
criminally negligent, but there is no right to subject these offenders
to an "eye-for-an-eye" type of justice, nor is there any need for that
system.
However, this advancement should not be the final chapter in
reforming the homicide laws. Further steps are necessary at this time
in order to culminate a commendable beginning. A great deal can be
accomplished in this area by prosecutors accurately wording indict-
ments to conform to the decisions and the language of KRS 435.022,
and by the legislature enacting the remainder of the proposed act.31
By so doing, we may well see Kentucky homicide law brought into
the forefront of modern thinking in this field, and the progress will be
enlightening and gratifying.
Barlow Ropp
31 See note 8 supra. If the remaining parts were passed, particularly the
portion on voluntary manslaughter, it would give a better definition of what con-
stitutes each crime and thereby provide for clearer distinctions as to what crime
the accused committed,
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